Letter 8.
(Continued from issue 4.)
The
difficulties which arise from the prophecies concerning the delivery and
return of the Jews not being completed, are obviated by pretending that
none of these prophecies ought to be taken in their plain, literal sense
and obvious meaning; in other words, they will not allow the prophecies
to have any meaning at all, in order to impose on all such prophecies,
and likewise on many historical passages of Scripture, what they call a
spiritual, or figurative and typical sense, and meaning of their own,
such as best suits with their purposes; accommodating, by these mean
prophecies and history to events with which neither the one nor the
other has the least connexion, contrary to the express sense of the
prophets and the passages cited, and therefore, they cannot expect any
credit should be given them. Of this, the most learned are sensible, and
confess that they “can give no tolerable reason why the prophecies
concerning his (Jesus’s) humiliation and sufferings should be
understood in a literal, and those of his exaltation and glorious reign,
in a spiritual sense.”* The case then stands thus: the Jews must be
convinced from the prophecies, that Jesus was the glorious person
therein promised for their Messiah; not according to the sense and
meaning of the words of the prophets, for they are entirely repugnant to
such pretensions, but according to the sense and meaning which
Christians shall be pleased arbitrarily to impose on all the prophets,
(without assigning any tolerable reasons, as is confessed by them.)
though that sense be the most contradictory to the prophets’
description; for otherwise they can prove nothing. It is a very just and
judicious observation, “that the Jew possessed the oracles of God, and
was firmly persuaded of the truth of them. The very first thing,
therefore, that he had to do, upon the appearance of the Messiah, was to
examine his title, by the character given of him in in prophets; he
could not, consistently with the belief in God and faith in the ancient
prophecies, attend to other arguments, till fully satisfied and
convinced in this. All the prophecies of the OId Testament, relating to
the office and character of the Messiah, were immovable bars to all
pretensions, till fulfilled and accomplished in the person.Ӡ This
is so fair a state of the case, that none of the parties can reasonably
have any objection against it; and there only wants proofs that Jesus
did fulfil and accomplish the character given of the Messiah in the
prophets.
| *Universal
History, vol. 3, p. 39. |
†Sherlock
on Prophecy. 6th Discourse, p. 157. |
Now
if this be done according to the plain sense and meaning of the
prophecies, the character which they give us is so contradictory and
repugnant to that of Jesus, that his pretensions can have no
manner of foundation on that description; for the plain sense of the
prophecies are, and ever will be, immovable bars to his claim.
But
if we are to judge of his title from the sense which Christians impose
on the prophets, then the character given by the prophecies can be of no
manner of signification, and, therefore, it would be in vain to examine
his title by the character given of him in the prophets; since, let the
character be ever so ample and plain, yet such a meaning would be
imposed on the words of the prophets as might make them answer very
different purposes. And this is actually the case; for if we are to have
no regard to the plain sense and meaning of the prophets, and take a
liberty to depart from their literal and obvious meanings, how can we
distinguish the true Messiah from the vain pretender, who may, by types
and allegories, impose such a sense of his own on the prophecies as may
easily be made to answer his pretensions, and by such means apply them
to himself and his purposes, construing them according to his fancy,
and, under a pretence of a refined spiritual sense, be able to prove
thereby all the passages of his life, both from prophecy and Scripture
history? For as no regard is to be had to the prophets’ literal
meaning, no bounds can be put to any person’s imaginations; for all
will be spiritualized. But
would not the Jews be in the most deplorable condition, if they admitted
allegory for proof? would they not be liable to the grossest abuse and
deception? and could they in any other way oppose such pretenders, but
from the plain and literal sense of the prophecies and believe that the
prophets had but that one plain sense and meaning, and to argue
accordingly from it? For to suppose that “an author has but one
meaning at a time to a proposition, (which is to be found out by a
critical examination or his words,) and to cite that proposition from
him, and argue from it in that one meaning, is to proceed by the common
rules of grammar and logic, which, being human rules, are not very
difficult to be set forth and explained; but to suppose passages cited,
explained, and argued from in any other method, seems very
extraordinary.”* And such a method can only serve to open a door to
fraud and imposition; for when once we depart from the plain and obvious
meaning of an author, and put a different sense on his words, we then
commit such an act of violence as nothing can justify. But it is still
worse, when we do the like to inspired writings; for we, in such case,
deprive the prophet of his meaning, which is infallible, and in its
place substitute our own weak fallible sense, and that for no other
reason but because it best serves our purposes; and it must give one a
very bad opinion of the cause which depends on such a support. For
“allegory is a figure in discourse which we are then said to use, when
we make the terms which are peculiar to one thing to signify
another.Ӡ This being the case, can allegory or types prove any
thing, much less a Messiah, whose character and office are plainly
revealed in the Scriptures? And pray, what is there which may not be
proved,when terms and words, peculiar to one thing, are made to signify
another?
| *Grounds
and Reasons, page 51. |
†Calmet's
Dictionary, on the word Allegory. |
What
confusion must ensue on such a scheme? How invalid must the proof of the
Messiah be, if founded on types and allegory! For “allegorical
explanations may edify indeed” (says a learned person) “but they are
good for nothing else; they cannot be regularly produced as proofs of
any thing.” St. Paul founded Christianity on allegory, and though he
says that he uses great “plainness of speech,”* yet is all Scripture
by him turned into type. This he does even to the historical passages,
and that when the literal sense is most clear. To this end he declares
himself and others to be “ministers of the New Testament, not of the
letter, but of the spirit, for” (says he) “the letter killeth, but
the spirit giveth life.Ӡ It is by this invention that he pretends
to prove every thing; for he applies his allegories and types without
the least resemblance, or without the least likeness of the types to the
antitype. This is plain and evident from every chapter of the writings
which go under his name. Thus, for example, he makes the patriarch's two
sons, Isaac and Ishmael, to typify two covenants.‡
Again—Abraham’s
concubine is with him a type of Mount Sinai, in Arabia.§ This same
Mount Sinai in Arabia stands with him for a type of Jerusalem to bondage
with her children. He carries this type still farther; for this same
Jerusalem typifies that above, which he calls the mother of all.|| After
the same manner he makes Malchizedek a type of Jesus, whom he declares
to have been made like the Son of God.¶ By the same art he turns the
veil which Moses put over his face, where it shone, into a type of the
Jews not understanding the Scriptures, that is, his spiritual sense of
them.** the same way he pretends that God himself preached the gospel to
Abraham.†† By the same help he declares the baptism of the
Israelites unto Moses. This he finds typified by their passing the Red
Sea, and their being under the cloud of smoke.‡‡ The water which the
Israelites drank from the rock Moses struck, he calls spiritual drink;
and he not only makes that rock to follow the camp, but will have the
rock itself to be the Messiah.§§ By the same never-failing art he
proves that the tribe of Levi paid tithe some hundred years before its
existence.|||| In short, the passover, the tabernacle, and every thing
in it, the Israelites’ wanderings in the wilderness, their entering
into the land of Canaan, and the whole Jewish economy and history is, by
St. Paul turned into types; and he makes every thing subservient to his
point. But if this method proves any thing, it proves that the same
passages and figures might prove a thousand things besides, for which
they may be made to stand, and such proofs would be, to the full, as
conclusive as St. Paul’s.
| § Ibid. 4. 25. |
**2 Cor. 3.13-15. |
§§ Ibid. 3, 4. |
| || Ibid. 4. 26. |
††Galat. 3. 8 |
|||| Heb. 7. 9, 10. |
| ¶ Heb. 7. 3. |
‡‡1 Cor. 10. 1, 2. |
|
This must be the natural consequence of believing
that the letter killeth, or rather, of resolving to kill the letter;
because, otherwise the letter would kill their purposes: and when once
we embrace the opinion of making the terms which are peculiar to one
thing stand for another, the same thing may be made to typify things the
most opposite and contrary to each other. Thus it is observed, that
“the serpent was remarkable for an insidious cunning, and therefore
stands as a proper emblem of a deceiver.”* Another asserts that “it
cannot be doubted but under the name of the serpent we ought to
understand the devil.Ӡ Yet, not withstanding the serpent stands
for, and means the devil; one of the evangelists declares, “as Moses
lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the son of man be
lifted up:”‡ by which means the serpent serves to typify both Jesus
and the devil. Such strange things are allegories! A fruitful
imagination might still carry the allegory farther, and show how the
serpent caused the people to err by the worship which was paid it.
| *Sherlock
on Prophecy, p. 57. |
†Calmet's
Dict., on the word Serpent. |
‡John
3. l4. |
Now
let me seriously ask, can such whims be admitted for proofs? or can any
one pretend the conversion of the Jews on such evidence? May we not as
well believe Luther to have been the antitype of Aaron, (as one of his
followers pretended,) because he first set up the candlestick of the
reformation? or shall we believe Calvin to have been the antitype of the
same High Priest (as one of his followers pretended), “because it was
beyond all doubt,” (says he,) “that if he had not taken the snuffers
into his hand, the candlestick must have given so dim a light that few
people would have been the better for it.§ Pray, is there not just the
same foundation for the idle dreams of Luther’s and Calvin's
followers, in making each their master to be Aaron’s antitype, as
there is for those others made by St. Paul? If we believe the one, why
not the other? Can such reveries pass because delivered under the name
of this or that man? The authority of all men must be upon a level, if
they deliver things alike inconsistent, or equally contrary to facts.
How easily may Scripture be applied to every passage of a man's life, if
such liberty be allowed? But certainly any person would be deservedly
laughed at who should pretend to prove the actions of his life from
thence by turning it into types.
It
is therefore evident that the prophecies ought to be taken in their
plainest and most obvious sense and literal meaning: “for it is but
justice to the omnipotent Being to believe that HE speaks candidly and
intelligibly to his creatures,”|| and is highly derogating from the
goodness of God to think otherwise; and therefore the contrary method,
when made use of, must be incoherent and inconsistent, enthusiastical
and erroneous, invented for unwarrantable purposes, and made use of to
deceive and blind our eyes for lack of better proof, excluding the
Scripture from any meaning at all; and as it may be made use of to prove
any thing, and to square to every man’s opinion, it can of course have
no force in argument, and therefore cannot be produced in proof of any
thing. Of this opinion was Bishop Smallbrook, who says: “So very
fanciful a thing is allegorical interpretation, that not only different
fathers build different allegories on the same facts, but the very same
father at different times, and on different subjects, makes different
applications of the very same literal story;”* and in his preface he
says: “Allegories prove any thing out of any thing.”†
I cannot better
conclude this letter, than with a passage of the same bishop,‡
viz.:—“All that I would desire of the reader here, is to observe the
great uncertainty of mystical interpretation in itself, as it is a mere
creature of fancy.”
(To
be continued.) |